A complex, collaborative and positive-sum discipline
A simple, adversarial and zero-sum competition
The difference between the two is whether or not you pretend there’s a legitimate consensus on “good deals”, and thus whether competition and access are meaningful forces.
If you embrace this fantasy, a few convenient things happen:
You can win at VC by compounding brand strength
You can win at VC by dominating relationships
Venture capital becomes “scalable”
Capital and influence concentrates
Thus, venture capital morphs from a loose collection of boutique investors into an oligopolistic mob.
The rent-seeking behavior this enables is so seductive that it has been able to resist all contrary evidence:
What’s left is an industry with few leaders and many followers. For the weak-willed majority, conviction atrophies and cements their position as the vulnerable minor parties in a commensal relationship.
While this is problematic in a few obvious ways (the failure of fiduciary duty to LPs, the failure to founders), there is one critical issue: it completely undermines the positive-sum attitude that has been central to venture capital’s success.
Finite Games and Infinite Games
You might hear investors saying that venture capital feels more competitive than ever. What they really mean is that venture capital feels more adversarial than ever.
As power and capital concentrates, and the focus is increasingly on winning a finite number of the “best” deals in each vintage, venture capital is necessarily less competitive.
Truly competitive games are infinite games. You don’t just care about winning, you also care about the scale of that win.
To use basketball as an analogy:
A finite game player might simply care whether or not their team wins the next game, and the next championship. As long as they win, that’s all that matters.
An infinite game player cares about stats like the ~42,000 US city parks with basketball hoops. They care that ~40% of 13-17 year olds regularly play pick-up basketball, and the ~18,000 US high schools that sponsor basketball programs.
Many competitive pursuits die as a finite games because they are dominated by an early elite who are hostile to newcomers and casuals. They choose winning a smaller outcome over competing for a larger outcome.
Venture capital, the success of Silicon Valley, and much of today’s technological progress, was built on an infinite game: Recognising the opportunity to develop an ecosystem, rather than simply dominating what little existed.
When an investor (either GP or LP) says indiscriminately that VC does not need more capital, they are implicitly advocating for a finite game. They prefer that competition is restricted, even if that also limits the scale of opportunity for the category as a whole.
In the US, this attitude is becoming a problem as boutique firms are displaced by agglomerators. While the two aren’t in direct competition for LP dollars, the environment is increasingly defined by the participants with the most influence.
In Europe, this attitude is an entrenched problem. European venture capital did not emerge from an infinite game mindset as it did in the US. For all the anecdotes about Europe’s merchant banks, venture capital is an import that has quickly been seized by opportunists. This is why Europe’s venture capital scene has remained relatively small, at a cost to growth and prosperity. There has never been a vision for abundance.
City Parks for Entrepreneurship
If you want to take an infinite game approach to venture capital, you need to care that entrepreneurship is accessible, and that the interface between capital and talent is healthy.
To the agglomerators, this interface is addressed by scout programs where ambitious young adults seek startups that fit a pattern — as the incentives are to optimise for partner approval. So, more capital flows into SF/NY, Stanford and Harvard Grads, ex-Mag7 employees, AI tools, etc. The pool of opportunity narrows, but you aim to win more of it.
To the boutique investors, this interface is addressed by scouring college campuses and builder communities. They are looking for outliers; the people with ideas so outlandish that it may not have even occured to them to seek investment yet. The pool of opportunity grows, and you may win more of it.
The former is obviously a finite game. The latter is obviously an infinite game.
If the goal is (as commonly stated) the pursuit of abundance through progress, venture capital is implicitly an infinite game and we should care deeply about the entrepreneurial equivalent of city park basketball courts; distributing awareness, access and opportunity as widely as possible.
The fact that so much of the industry is focused on gatekeeping and exclusivity is an obvious signal of distress.
Rothenberg’s Paradox
A paradox in this story is that the scale of capital going to the finite game is much larger, and is growing more quickly.
How then is that the finite game?
This reflects what we might call Rothenberg’s Paradox: any successful infinite game creates opportunity for rent-seeking via finite game players. The scale of capital becomes the central opportunity, like a snake eating its own tail.
For now, venture capital maintains the illusion of a booming industry with growing opportunity — while it’s really just getting better at financial engineering and wealth extraction.
Many countries have developed policy aimed at supporting the growth of domestic venture capital ecosystems — hoping to close the gap with the US.
In the EU, a key premise is that that underdeveloped private markets leave a “‘growth-capital gap” for scaling companies, limiting the potential of EU-based tech startups.
Bluntly, this is what happens when bureaucrats are left to design industrial policy: Solutions are designed to patch-over outcomes, ignoring a more problematic diagnosis.
In truth:
There is less growth investment in the EU because there are simply fewer attractive investments.
The most obvious opportunities are snapped up by faster-moving US investors with stronger brands.
Thus, there is even less market impetus for the development of the EU’s growth capital environment.
So, pouring money into this “growth-capital gap” has predictably negative outcomes:
Instead of addressing a lack of investment by injecting more capital, the EU must tackle the root cause: aiming policy at generating more opportunity.
Instead of allocating capital to a known quantity of growth-stage companies, policy must drive capital into raw potential, at the earliest stages, with faith that it will electrify entrepreneurship.
The “inception capital gap”
To frame this with a few obvious but important facts:
The EU has a significantly larger population than the US (450M vs 340M).
Pre-seed funding in the US was approximately 13x the scale of pre-seed funding in the EU in 2023.1
Angel funding in the US was approximately 23x the scale of angel funding in the EU in 2023.2
While the growth-scale capital gap might appear more obvious in sheer scale (the total US VC environment is ~$130B larger than the EU / about 4x the scale), it is important to remember that all growth activity is downstream of early investment.
If companies cannot raise angel capital, or institutional pre-seed and seed rounds, they will never reach the point of contributing to the opportunity of growth-stage investment.
Breaking Zero-Sum Loops
The problem many young venture capital ecosystems face is that haven’t truly embraced the spirit of (ad)venture: escape from zero-sum thinking.
The usual loop looks something like this:
A small pool of early-stage capital has a lower risk-appetite which manifests as restrictions on access.
Restricted access means safer investments in companies that are inherently less likely to be outliers.
It’s also reflected in credentialism and pattern-matching, which further erode returns over time.
The outcome is a limited number of great outcomes which cannot sustain significant growth of the ecosytem.
The US was able to break this loop via a cultural tolerance of risk. Particularly, a general trend toward positive sum thinking and looseness, often described as a “frontier mentality”.
Outside of the US, this may be harder to achieve. Leverage can be applied via policy to help break the catch-22: finding motive to invest in the potential of future investment opportunities.
This is particularly true for institutional LPs, who are unfamiliar with the idiosyncracies of venture capital and more likely to think in Private Equity terms — reluctant to back GPs at the earliest stages, who take the greatest risk.
Manifesting opportunity
Following this logic, the role of the government should be to fund emerging managers (funds 1-3) who target venture capital investment at the earliest stages.
This allocation would be reduced over time as emerging managers develop their track record and attract more private LP capital. By fund 4, with roughly a decade in the market, GPs should be able to function independent of government capital.
By increasing the capital availability for early-stage managers, they will increase risk appetite, diversify what gets investment, and enable a range of more innovative origination strategies. Esssesntially, this promotes the “entropic distribution” of capital, where capital flows through the cracks and crevices of industry to seek opportunity.
There is already significant data out there to establish that this approach works:
Shifting allocated capital to early-stage investments produces the same uplift in productivity as doubling the total capital allocation (according to a 2025 study of government venture capital investment in Europe).
Where governments fund emerging managers, they can produce above-market success rates (according to a 2024 study of activity in 15 EU member states) and better rates of job creation (according to a 2018 study on government-backed VC firms in Europe).
In addition, the lack of angel activity should be addressed more directly via tax reduction schemes — especially for employee stock compensation. Stock compensation is how Europe can create a flywheel which distributes success into new opportunities.
Summary: lessons for the EU (and beyond)
There is a significant delta between US growth-stage investing and EU growth-stage investing, and a lack of EU scale-up success stories.
At a glance, the obvious policy move is to push capital into growth investing. Indeed, the EU already commits significant capital to private markets — e.g. 37% of 2023’s VC total.
This is the EU throwing huge sums of money at symptom management. A colossal waste.
The more pressing concern (which could be addressed at less expense) is the gaping chasm between US angel and pre-seed funding versus the EU. Funding the generation engine of entrepreneurial potential.
Indeed, the EU is stuck in zero-sum thinking which is reflected in attitudes across the bloc; in competition between hubs, between governments, and even between specific actors within those ecosystems.
If institutional LPs in the EU are hesitant to solve this problem, by committing to the uncertainty of emerging managers in the earliest stages, the state should consider stepping in.3
While this is an almost non-existent view in policy today, the data is clear that this is the central opportunity for government investment in venture capital across a number of metrics:
The growth of startup ecosystems
Enabling technological innovation
Driving high-skill job creation
Return on government investment
Feeding downstream growth ecosystems
(top image: The Tower of Babel by Pieter Bruegel the Elder)
The role of startup valuation in staged capital deployment
In his article VCs should play bridge, Alex Danco described the Capital Coordination problem in venture capital, created by the staged nature of investments.
I recommend reading the whole piece, but the summary is that investments are de-risked by staging capital over future milestones (with the implied valuation step-ups) rather than investing everything up-front and hoping for the best.
The heart of this strategy is the signalling game where investors offer affirmation of the investment for their capital partners.
“This gives the next investor cover to say, ok, I’ll do the same thing. I’ll invest at $20M, sending a signal: I believe that this price reflects a discount to the next round. This 20 million price, by current convention, means we believe this hand will play out as another X million in GMV run rate”, or whatever it is your signalling for this new round of bidding.”
Danco’s assessment speaks to the oddly myopic perspective of “venture math“: investors are primarily focused on understanding incremental progress (measured with ARR) rather than the ultimate outcome. This has come at a cost to sectors that are slower to start generating revenue but solve much more important problems.
He’s right to frame venture capital as collaborative (Bridge) rather than strictly adversarial (Poker), this also highlights issues like enmeshment and collusion which emerge when so much stress is put on relationship-driven outcomes over objective measurement.
The approach that Danco describes as “convention bidding” is framed as an alternative to the zero-sum attitude of formal valuation — where investors are primarily concerned with securing their own returns rather than participating in affirmative semaphore.
Indeed, this reflects a revealed preference for market signals over conviction which should trouble anyone who still believes venture capital is responsible for risk capital formation.
Discounting the Future
Peter Thiel on the importance of pitching your startup as a “discount to the future”
Most founders will pitch their startup valuation as a sort of premium on the last round (e.g. “Our valuation last year was X, we’ve made Y progress, and now we deserve a valuation 2x greater.”)… pic.twitter.com/WZ0fSHxWhH
Further to the above, Danco’s article is a good reflection of venture capital’s poor grasp of valuation, characterised by three common misconceptions:
Valuation is transient, and at each stage a new valuation would need to be calculated — creating uncertainty that threatens signal-driven coordination.
Valuation is the same as price, and entry points are more a function of market norms and comps than they are of fundamental value creation.
The practice of valuation is built on too much uncertainty to be practical for early stage companies.
While the first is inaccurate, the second is actually dangerous. The general practice of market-driven pricing has created huge structural fragility in venture capital, exacerbating the already painfully boom-and-bust nature.
The third, however, is just silly. All investments are predicated on valuation, at least in theory (the alternative being mindless momentum investing). The only difference is whether it’s written out with explicit assumptions or a mental calculation with implicit assumptions.
Indeed, valuation is essentially the story of a startup (“What happens if things go right?”) translated into numbers, with some discounting for the cost of capital and risk of failure. You can think of it as the financial source code of a pitch.
Usefully, by calculating a terminal value based on that story and discounting it using the expected rate of return in venture capital, you can also ascertain a healthy entry point for future rounds — assuming the startup remains broadly on track.
Consider the below: the valuation of a Seed round, calculated on Equidam at just over $20M. As a part of this calculation, and the future it’s predicated on, you can also see the valuation trajectory for the forecasted period. If the company raised a Series A at ~30 months, the valuation would be around $85M.
Of course, all of the usual caveats: the future is uncertain, startups pivot, markets shift. However, it’s fairly easy to built those adjustments into a model and see how they change both today’s valuation and the future trajectory.
Assessing valuation with a higher resolution view of performance enables better judgements: Perhaps top-line revenue is growing on track, but costs are surging. Maybe revenue is lagging, but margins are way better than expected.
The hope is not that forecasts play out precisely, but that they give you a useful relative perspective on performance over time.
If venture capitalists wanted a way to coordinate staged capital in the future, to finance a company efficiently (with minimal time spent agonising over terms) while ensuring a good risk-adjusted return for all investors, this is the logical approach.
Valuation is essentially the process of aligning expectations across market participants by transparently exploring data and assumptions. Typically this occurs between buyer and seller (VC and founder) in a specific transaction, but there’s no reason why downstream capital providers couldn’t benefit from that work.
It also offers the vital benefits of helping investors better understand the value of novel innovation, and limiting exposure to systematic risk of market-based pricing — getting caught in the trap of “money chasing deals“.
(top image: “The Bulls and Bears in the Market” by William Holbrook Beard)
A previous article discussed why venture capital has such a myopic focus on backward-looking metrics connected to ARR.
The summary is that people struggle with uncertainty, and there are two ways to cope: embrace it scientifically, or build a structure that lets people gamble on it.
Enter “casino culture”.
“Sports betting, shitcoins, meme stocks, vibe coding 100m in six hours, etc, are all expressions of the same deep cultural rot. If youth don’t believe there’s legitimate ways to get rich through work, all of culture will become a rotten sports book for the soul.”
If you want to bet on startups, ARR provides a convenient metric to compress complexity and uncertainty into one dimension, reducing venture capital to a simple horse-race.
Investors make bets on momentum categories, riding the wave of revenue driven by large injections of capital, and hope they can raise another fund or exit before the music stops.
“It’s very difficult to invest money well, and I think it’s all but impossible to do time after time after time in venture capital. Some of the deals get so hot, and you have to decide so quickly, that you’re all just sort of gambling.”
The beneficiaries of this limbic shift are the agglomerators, who play the role of “the house”; appearing to participate in the risk while harvesting beta from the associated activity.
For other investors, there are incentives to play:
Primarily, it gives GPs a simpler story to sell to LPs, inspiring greater confidence. They can enthusiastically shill consensus ideas and relationship-based access — which is exactly what many LPs want to hear, despite the poor returns.
Secondly, it diversifies away accountability. As more investors jump on-board the momentum train, individual career risk is exchanged for greater systematic fragility. When the market collapses, they can survive on relationships.
By turning venture capital into a game of chance, abusing the principal-agent problem, their job is greatly simplified: It’s the blue pill of steak dinners and congeniality, not the red pill of grinding hackathons and building portfolios.
Unfortunately, by abstracting the performance if investments from the underlying asset value with crude proxy metrics, the concept of “innovation” is mostly a mirage. It may be difficult to perceive at the time, when the traction feels real, but few truly important companies emerge from this environment.
Essentially, a category emerges as the focal point for venture allocation, concentrating capital, and participants begin flipping coins under the long-standing premise that the upside of winners is always much greater than the downside of losses.
In the end, everyone eventually loses — except the house.
It turns out that the very behavior they engage in is destroying returns, and the only winner is the person collecting fees to manage the bank.
“Risk too much hunting jackpots and the volatility will turn positive expected value into a straight line to zero. In the world of compounded returns, the dose makes the poison.”
A rough example of the logic driving investment decisions amongst the most degenerate venture investors:
You’re evaluating a company with $7.5M ARR
$5M is net new ARR, annual burn is $10M
That’s a 2x burn multiple (BM)
You invest $30M at a market-rate of 20x ARR
Assuming 2x BM, $30M produces $15M in net new ARR
At 20x ARR, it gets marked up from $150M to $450M
On paper, that checks all the boxes: an investment that was subsequently marked up 3x using logic that could be decoded on an iPhone calculator.
Indeed, the role of multiples is to produce calculations that are easier and faster; to get deals done and put capital to work.
There are two major flaws with this approach:
The first is that multiples are backwards-looking. By applying to current revenue or burn, they rely on past performance. All assumptions about the future are squashed down into the multiple itself. Venture capital relies on making good judgements about the future, not the past.
The second is that multiples assume that all revenue is created equal. They ignore unit economics and capital expenditure, and nor do they fully appreciate churn. Finally, and particularly relevant today, they encourage founders to engage in creative accounting to boost ARR.
“We’ve actually come back to saying there’s a real advantage to seeng the GAAP revenue accounting, to make sure all the money is showing up for real.
There’s a lot of noise in that multiple, and when they were all SaaS recurring revenue businesses — all seat based, all 90% or 80% gross margin with no CapEx, all enterprise sales with low churn — it absolutely made sense. You could compare two companies. Thats’s why by 2019 or 2020 it almost felt like ‘fill in the form to give me the valuation’.
Consider, for example, the venture capitalist’s typical disdain for discounted cash flow (DCF) style thinking in valuation: There are too many assumptions, the future is too uncertain.
So, instead, they price with ARR multiples, which include all of the same assumptions about the future, but obfuscates them into simple calculation. Out of sight, out of mind.
“Some investors swear off the DCF model because of its myriad assumptions. Yet they readily embrace an approach that packs all of those same assumptions, without any transparency, into a single number: the multiple. Multiples are not valuation; they represent shorthand for the valuation process. Like most forms of shorthand, multiples come with blind spots and biases that few investors take the time and care to understand.”
Indeed, multiples are a popular tool precisely because they hide all of that detail. Remember, venture capital is (unfortunately) a game of building confidence with simple stories, not demonstrating competence with complex truths.
Financial engineering built on multiples is the bedrock of venture capital’s creeping financialisation.
Imagine you invest $20 in a company that generates $4 in ARR from each customer, with a CAC of $20. It trades at a multiple of 20x ARR.
In practice, that company is losing $16 on every customer in the first year, with payback over 5 years assuming no churn.
On paper, every $1 into the company produces $4 in marked value for the investor. It’s a great looking investment.
This is precisely the mechanic which incentivises insane capital consumption on negative unit economics. Investors trade financial health for faster markups, knowing that it’s a bust if the environment shifts.
“Guess what happened once Founders realized that VCs were valuing startups using revenue multiples? They started playing a game of Hungy Hungry Hippo with the goal of accumulating as much revenue as they could!”
…contributes to VCs losing the ability to build independent conviction, encouraging herd-behavior.
In conclusion, multiples are a tool for quick comparison across peers. Not for pricing, and not for understanding performance or potential of a startup. They include far too many important and unchecked assumptions, limiting an investor’s understanding of the specific future of a company.
Proper valuation, with multiples used as a sanity-check afterwards, is the way.
“We often pursue this kind of rationalization as a spot check, generally after going through the valuation process. When the multiple is implied, investors will then compare it to others seen in the public and private markets to get more comfortable. Think of it like a gut check, a way to determine if the valuation feels ‘reasonable’.”
Early-stage venture capital is characterised by uncertainty. Success lies in high-risk, non-consensus ideas that take many years to play out.
There are two ways that LPs grapple with this uncertainty, as institutional allocators to VC:
Seeking competence: managers that understand how to extract value from uncertainty.
Seeking confidence: managers that inspire the most certainty about future success.
For reasons best described by Daniel Kahneman, LPs are inclined towards the latter. This manifests as poorly managed risk; under-developed portfolio construction and overconcentration.
This is despite a large body of research illustrating the following:
Diversification encourages VCs to take more idiosyncratic risk, which drives outperformance.
Indeed, this is not without precedent. Some of the greatest early-stage VCs have unusually large portfolios: Boost VC, First Round, BoxGroup and Precursor are obvious examples.
Despite the data, and the many anecdotal success stories, LPs are notoriously hesistant to back diversified strategies. By believing they can diversify at the LP level, across a portfolio of firms, they miss the systematic benefits of diversification and inhibit the compounding gains from process refinement.
Portfolio Maths
Earlier this year I posted a breakdown of expected venture capital returns based on simulating two seed portfolio models: one with 100 small checks, the other with 20 larger checks.
The graphic was meant to illustrate a simple point: based on a typical range of VC outcomes, the more diversified portfolio was likely to outperform, delivering a narrower and more attractive band of potential return scenarios.
“Typical” is the operative word there, as while the graphic implies the diversified portfolio wont exceed a 6x return, that’s only if you deliver average performance. It’s entirely possible for a GP to outperform in either strategy — although research indicates that the diversified portfolio is likely to have moreupside.
The statistical basis for this is simple: given venture capital’s reliance on outliers outcomes, the low probability and low predictability of those outcomes, it is more beneficial to make more investments (with lower ownership), than to have more ownership (with fewer investments).
The coversation that followed (credit to the always-insightful Peter Walker for sharing it with his audience) highlighted a deeper problem with the industry’s understanding of portfolio strategy, risk management and cognitive biases.
Overconfidence
A good place to start is Daniel Kahneman’s work on cognitive biases in investing:
“The confidence we experience as we make a judgment is not a reasoned evaluation of the probability that it is right. Confidence is a feeling, one determined mostly by the coherence of the story and by the ease with which it comes to mind, even when the evidence for the story is sparse and unreliable. The bias toward coherence favors overconfidence. An individual who expresses high confidence probably has a good story, which may or may not be true.”
As a crude summary, imagine an LP speaks to two VCs:
One says they’ll invest in 100 companies and expect that ~75 of them will be be writen-off. The fund returns will primarily hinge on ~1-5 investments.
The second explains that they have a powerful network advantage, and they’ll deliver huge returns from concentrated ownership in just 15 companies.
The LP is likely to go with the second VC, who builds more confidence by telling a simpler and more coherent story; they simply have access to “better investments”. What’s not to love?
And few investors demand diversified funds, so GPs don’t offer them. A slow and steady “venture is a numbers game” pitch is much less emotionally compelling than “I am a rock star who can consistently beat the odds.” And GPs need an emotionally appealing pitch to get funded.
LPs want to hear confidence, so that’s what VCs offer. Thus, “overconfidence” is by far the most prevalent and dangerous cognitive bias in VC behaviour.
This mode of favouring confidence over competence leads to a number of dogmatic beliefs amongst the LP community:
That relationships drive better investments in VC — which is only vaguely true in hot markets when it’s easy to collect markups from your friends.
That venture capital funds themselves operate with power law outcomes — which is only true because of the unnecessary and toxic levels of concentration.
That VCs are supposed to “pick” their way to success — rather than relying on well designed origination strategies and a systematic approach to capturing outliers.
Overconcentration
Overconfidence primarily manifests as overconcentration; portfolios with poorly managed risk. Too much capital, concentrated into too few investments, with high levels of uncertainty. This is typically measured with the Sharpe Ratio in grown-up investment strategies.
The influence of concentration is obviously double-edged, as it compounds both good and bad investment decisions.
However, research shows that this amplification is not evenly distributed: overconcentration hurts underperformers more than it helps overperformers.
So, if venture capital were systamatically overconcentrated, you would expect to see a wider distribution of returns and a lower average return, relative to other strategies. As it happens, that’s an accurate description:
There’s a good argument that the poor persistence of performance in venture capital can be attributed to shallow narratives around “picking” which undermine basic theory around portfolio construction and behavioral economics.
Not only does this damage persistence, it’s particularly toxic for new entrants who may attempt to piece together a strategy from the “common wisdom” available to them.
Instead of being encouraged to adopt practices that are optimal for more consistent above-benchmark returns, emerging managers are pushed toward the “rockstar” narrative of outsized promises.
You might raise an eyebrow at this, if you are familiar with the history of venture capital incumbents strategically freezing out new entrants in order to maintain advantageous pricing power.
Intitutional Insecurity
“Perhaps the most powerful lesson from Marks is the idea of ‘uncomfortably idiosyncratic’ investing. Citing the late David Swensen of Yale, Marks emphasizes that successful investment management requires taking positions that feel uneasy because they go against the grain.”
If investment performance is driven by adopting “uncomfortably idiosyncratic” positions, it’s reasonable to assume this is especially true for early stage venture capital — where non-consensus investing drives outperformance.
“You will know you are doing real venture capital when you aren’t competing with other investors to finance a deal but are instead offering to invest in people, industries and ideas that don’t yet have access to capital. That is where money can be most useful, and also where returns can be the highest.”
VCs take a systematic approach to managing idiosyncratic risk through portfolio construction; optimising for larger outcomes and failure rates than other strategies. Indeed, VCs with larger portfolios appear comfortable accomodating more idiosyncratic risk, which ultimately contributes to stronger performance.
In fact, you could probably summarise the VC strategy as the art and science of systematically extracting value from idiosyncracy.
The lingering question, given all of this evidence, is why aren’t larger early-stage portfolios the default in venture capital?
The answer is agglomerator-leak; the “loudest model” of the mega-funds, which ends up influencing practices and perceptions across the whole venture market.
For example:
When you are investing billions in each cycle, you must pry your way into hottest companies of each vintage. The future of your firm depends on those bloated private-market darlings, and there is significant career-risk associated with missing them.
Thus, a number of ideological artefacts are spawned:
“You must be in the category winners, at any cost.”
“Only a handful of outcomes drive returns for each vintage.”
“Concentrated ownership drives outperformance.”
These artefacts latch onto insecurity like Pinterest self-help quotes. GPs and LPs looking for confidence through coherence, biased toward simple ideas, lap up this accessible wisdom from venture’s most influential characters.
Unfortunately, it means they apply the same thinking to early-stage investing, and much smaller funds operating a very different strategy, even when all evidence suggests that’s a very silly thing to do.
Process Alpha
From a well-diversified base of initial investments, it is possibe for a VC to double-down on winners over subsequent rounds. This is a process that Joe Milam, founder of AngelSpan, has dubbed “process alpha“.
Staging your capital deployment properly over multiple rounds dramatically improves the IRR for investors, regardless of the MOIC/DPI. And given the natural failure rates of startups (usually within the first 2 or 3 yrs), optimizing on how much you invest in each round improves the risk-adjusted returns available.
Essentially, this is how a VC can take the solid foundation of a well diversified initial portfolio and then build on that position with staged deployment into the best opportunities that emerge in subsequent rounds.
Conclusion
While it’s difficult to get into specific recommendations, it seems safe to make the case that early-stage venture capital firms should probably be significantly more diversified.
More importantly, the LP:GP interface is clearly problematic, and LPs need to think carefully about whether they bias towards confidence over competence.
In order to do so, they must grapple with the economic theory, and the reality of portfolio construction, to recognise why it’s important that there be a good level of diversification at the VC portfolio level.
“You should not take assertive and confident people at their own evaluation unless you have independent reason to believe that they know what they are talking about. Unfortunately, this advice is difficult to follow: overconfident professionals sincerely believe they have expertise, act as experts and look like experts. You will have to struggle to remind yourself that they may be in the grip of an illusion.”
There is no shortage of think-pieces on the state of venture, bemoaning concentration, slipping returns, and the challenging environment for smaller managers.
Few have tried to answer the underlying question:
The perspective that VC consolidation is poisonous for both innovation and returns is slowly but surely becoming mainstream.
Can’t wait for this to become a given so we can (finally!) move onto the much more interesting topic of “What comes next?”
First, the most concise formulation of the problem:
LP allocation to “VC” grew so quickly that there was no opportunity for the strategy to adapt and properly allocate the additional capital. Instead, it was captured by opportunists.
Thus, a majority of today’s “VC” activity is simple financialisation.
Venture capital involves making long-term investments in innovative, high-growth companies, with the goal of capturing outlier returns at exit.
“VC” is the process of using financial engineering to optimise fee income. Maximising proxy performance metrics by manifesting herd-like market momentum.
“VC” isn’t intrinsically bad: the agglomerators are responsible for pulling billions of dollars into technology investment, by developing a product suitable for the largest and wealthiest LPs with the lowest expectations.
However, there are three points the market needs to grapple with in order for venture capital to move forward:
1. Agglomerators have no business investing prior to Series C
The argument for their existence is that technological development often requires vast pools of growth capital, so why do they invest at seed?
The truth is rooted in financialisation: it’s easier to produce a mirage of proxy metrics if you can pick startups that fit the momentum narrative, and founders that will go along with it.
Another part of the reason is that these firms are doing very nicely from absorbing capital in the “VC” allocation bucket. Registered RIAs moving further away from early-stage investing might invite some unfavourable comparisons to their PE peers.
Indeed, exactly whose allocation are they displacing? Is it venture capital? Or is it the PE firms they maybe more closely resemble? Or is it the public markets they have drained of new growth opportunities?
We also know:
The hypercapitalising behavior of these large firms systematically breaks young startups.
They poorly built for early-stage investing, as large firm dynamics favour more obvious investments.
A decade of deal activity shows these firms are actively concentrating into consensus anyway.
The early-stage activity of these firms achieves very little of any merit. They bend the market to their consensus narrative, suffocate genuine innovation, and turn startups into volatile commodities in their hunt for “market winners”.
2. The agglomerator model of “VC” is an experiment
For all that many of these firms are well-established names in the venture capital ecosystem, their strategy is not.
In describing this bifurcation of the venture market, back in 2020, Nikhil Basu Trivedi stated “the next decade will be a referendum on agglomerators“. Essentially, until we see how these multi-billion dollar funds play out, it’s unclear what future the strategy has.
Indeed, we can learn from history: after the dotcom bubble burst, the industry collectively swore off >$1B funds (for a while), with GPs reflecting on the challenges of scaling venture capital.
There are similar lessons from the history of “mega-buyout funds”, as described by Meghan Reynolds of Altimeter:
“Mega Fund dynamic in VC mirrors the meteoric rise of Mega Buyout funds in ’05-’08. Post GFC, Mega Buyout went out of favor w/ many LPs. What happened after was an emergence of strong, highly sought after <$2B “middle market” funds that were thought to have greater alpha.”
3. Agglomerator practices have corrupted venture capital
Perhaps the most painful and pernicious aspect of all of this, is that the conflation of these multi-stage agglomerators with venture capital has led to a corruption of standards and practices.
Let’s be clear: venture capital has very little in the way of standards and practices. What there is, tends to be a mimmicry of “the loudest model“, which is the agglomerator playbook.
So, when they say things like “entry price doesn’t matter”, or “non-consensus investing is dangerous”, or “the only thing that matters is getting into the best deals”, they are talking their book. It reflects a strategy that simply does not apply to venture capital, where entry price does matter, all alpha is non-consensus, and nobody can predict the best deals.
The same is true for LPs, who derive much of their understanding of venture capital, and what “good” looks like, from these “loudest models”: When Marc Andreessen says “AI will save the world”, LPs demand that GPs have an AI thesis, even when a smart GP may be looking beyond that horizon, or at overlooked alpha elsewhere.
So, what comes next?
Hopefully, a number of things play out over the next five years:
We see the limitations of the agglomerator model, and venture capital can reclaim the early stage, yielding more effective and diverse origination with saner pricing and less volatile outcomes.
LPs slowly wise-up to this bifurcation of strategies, re-educate themselves about venture capital, make better allocation decisions and feel less inclined to impose upon GP strategy.
Agglomerators (re-classified as “venture growth”) become a defined sub-category of LPs private book, like venture capital. Publications like Pitchbook and CA start disaggregating performance into this new bracket.
Anyone who wants to play a fee-driven financialised game can go to venture growth, those who are driven by performance and impact can work in venture capital. Two different systems, each better understood and playing to their strengths.
Increasingly, venture capital will be able to tap into venture growth for liquidity as their portfolio matures, accelerating liquidity and feedback cycles to produce compounding performance gains.
Slowly but surely, venture capital may return to being a better-performing and more positive-sum strategy, focused on finding outliers and the discipline of properly managed risk. Less herd behavior, and less cognitive dissonance.
(top image: Meindert Hobbema’s The Avenue at Middelharnis)
Whether you’re investing in mature companies in the public market, or fast-growing startups in the private market, one question separates good and bad investors:
Do you understand valuation?
Valuation is the rationale by which you determine which opportunities to pursue. To develop your understanding of valuation is to develop your ability to recognise potential.
Despite the central role in investment decisions, valuation is often misconstrued as financial engineering or market-driven pricing exercises.
Valuation is an opinion
Here’s three things valuation is not:
Based on verifiable inputs
Provably accurate in output
A mirror of market sentiment
Instead, valuation is always an opinion based on a set of assumptions about an unknowable future.
“People act like it’s an award for past behavior. It’s not. It’s a hurdle for future behavior.”
Whether that valuation is based on a detailed DCF model or napkin-math, it’s an opinion. And it’s no more or less of an opinion as your process gets more or less sophisticated; the only difference is how clearly you outline the assumptions.
When one investor states that a company is overpriced, and another that it is undervalued, neither is right or wrong in the moment — they just have differing opinions.
Valuation can be a simple, implicit part of the process, or it can be an explicit exercise used to better understand an opportunity and check assumptions.
Valuation is a story about the future
In order to form an opinion about a particular future, you must first listen to its story.
“The value of a stock is what people believe it is and could be. A stock is a story.”
Valuationis the art of using stories to develop opinions about the future
Valuation can be broken down into a few pieces:
How do you judge the credibility of a story?
How do you estimate the economic potential of a story?
How do you estimate the risk associated with a story?
You can think about this via two extremes:
You’re looking at a company you’re familiar with. You’ve got a good mental model of the industry, the technology, the market forces, trajectory, and risks. It’s relatively simple for you to make a rough judgement on value in your head. This reflects Kahneman’s “System 1” thinking.
You’re looking at a company you have no familiarity with. The technology is novel, the market is emerging, and there’s no real precedent. In order to make a good judgement, you have to submerge yourself in details and scenarios. This reflects Kahneman’s “System 2” thinking.
In the latter case, a more sophisticated valuation process can help you understand the credibility and economic potential of a story. It provides a framework for ingesting information that can control biases, while allowing you to recognise and scrutinise the main drivers of value.
Valuation is essentially the act of running simulations of the future described in a story, focused on the numbers rather than the narrative, to explore the potential.
Pricing is not valuation / Trading is not investing / The present is not the future
Venture capitalists often choose to focus on relative pricing, instead of valuation, as an attempt to proxy experience through crowdsourced activity — allowing for speedy “System 1” style investment decisions.
This means analysing industry activity, which biases investment towards categories with low information friction like B2B SaaS, at a cost to sectors with more idiosyncracy, like deeptech.
Unfortunately that focus on market data also means these investors are not developing their ability to make judgements about the future, only to pattern match today. This compounds into a ‘knowledge worker atrophy‘ problem, weakening venture capital’s institutional competence at funding creative endeavors and novel solutions.
That would appear to be a critically weak link in the value proposition of venture capital, and the premise that it funds important solutions to humanity’s problems.
Consider this simple truth: All value created from Series A to exit is downstream of the first check. Without initial belief, the foundation of VC collapses.
This relatively thin slice of venture (by capital) is therefore disproportionately important. All future returns are directly attributable to the industry’s ability to surface new opportunities.
Despite this fundamental importance, venture capital is structurally rigged against origination:
Origination is inherently a small check pursuit, as these ideas need minimal capital to validate propositions.
LPs are biased against highly diversified VC strategies, particularly with the growth of Fund of Funds, which makes scaling an origination strategy more challenging.
Thus, origination is the domain of smaller firms, with smaller funds. This runs contrary to the compensation incentives in venture capital, which push successful investors to raise larger funds and invest at later stages.
“In exploring its sources, we document several additional facts: successful outcomes stem in large part from investing in the right places at the right times; VC firms do not persist in their ability to choose the right places and times to invest; but early success does lead to investing in later rounds and in larger syndicates.”
So, in addition to the existing problem of VC’s lack of institutional knowledge and high churn, good investors are often squeezed out of this origination focus if they wish to achieve greater scale.
Origination is the foundation on which all future VC returns are built, yet it is systematically underresourced and underallocated
You should be dubious of any venture capitalist that claims “there’s too much capital, and not enough good opportunities”.
You will never this claim from VCs focused on origination, who have to spend a distracting amount of time on their own fundraising — even when their track record is strong. Again, their size prohibits them from more easily raising from larger institutions.
This chronic misalignment sets the ceiling on what venture capital can achieve in returns and accelerated innovation
Instead, shifting allocation earlier, to improve origination, without any increase in capital, has an effect equivalent to doubling the total capital pool.
If all venture returns are downstream of origination, you would expect that a specific focus on origination would lead to outperformance amongst VCs. You would be right:
“The consensus in recent literature is clear: proactive deal origination is pivotal for achieving superior outcomes in venture capital investments.”
Fundamentally, this issue will not be resolved as long as the incentives in VC mean the primary opportunity is to maximise fee income by optimising for proxy metrics.
There is very little intrinsic motivation for VCs to take excessive career risk on highly idiosyncratic ideas, which generate slower markups than consensus startups, in the hope that they may generate some carry a decade down the line.
In summary: Venture capital is structurally set up to pile capital into categories with low information friction, which is diametrically opposed to innovation.
You’d have to be brave, crazy or stupid to do anything else.
The brilliant exceptions
Fortunately, for everyone involved, there are a few mission-driven firms that have made it their business to focus on origination.
In today’s market, you’re either a lifecycle capital partner to founders, or you’re a niche operator originating unique opportunities for those who can be.
To originate deal flow, one needs some combo of:
– unique networks; – top tier reputation in a niche; or – uncommon levels of investment rigor for company stage
All of these help drive signal for the company, which is incredibly valuable in a noisy market.
They have each developed specific proactive strategies to find high potential opportunities, first — sometimes before there’s even a company to invest in.
Firms that focus on early conviction and speed, like 1517 Fund and Hustle Fund — who write tiny inception checks to help prospective founders take the first step.
Firms that focus on research and expertise, like Compound and Not Boring Capital — who find contrarian needles in consensus haystacks by processing vast quantities of information.
Firms that focus on process and scale, like BoxGroup, Boost VC and First Round — who manage the greater idiosyncratic risk of origination with discipline and portfolio strategy.
Firms that focus on community and talent density, like South Park Commons, and Entrepreneur First — who allow opportunity to manifest from pools of brilliance.
(They all share the key elements: community, research, process and speed.)
It’s hard to state just how much value can be attributed to these firms, and a few others like them. Relative to their size, they are responsible for a disproportionate amount of founder opportunity and downstream potential.
To understand the potential for these models, Y Combinator and Founders Fund are a good illustration of the same principles at scale. For a range of reasons, these two firms have broken out of the orbit of VC’s structural limitations.
To conclude, a quote from Danielle Strachman on 1517 Fund’s approach to origination, and some links to great conversations with the other firms above:
“We call it turning over rocks. It’s like, oh, I went to this campus and I found an interesting young person; we’re turning over rocks. You go to a hackathon and my favorite thing is to look for the young person who is staring off into space. They’re by themselves because they built their own thing. You go up and you talk to them and you’re like, whoa, okay, you are really super nerded-out on security and you’re talking to me like I should know what you’re talking about, and I have no idea. But we’re gonna talk for a while and we’re gonna figure this out.”
In the decade since 2025, algorithmic capital has swallowed much of the private equity opportunity.
In response, “smart private equity” moved downstream to late-stage venture capital. Chasing the remaining alpha, VCs were compressed into the earliest stages.
At the same time, venture’s LPs had long been hungry for a better product with stronger returns and greater transparency.
2027 marked the end of “relationship capital” and sleight-of-hand with proxy metrics. Since the GFC, LPs had tolerated bloated funds, dangerous concentration and slipping performance. The need for a reset was clear.
By 2030, LPs began the transition to pooling their capital in algorithmic treasury DAOs, offering:
A scalable, automated vehicle that could balance allocation across a range of strategies.
The transparency of operating on-chain, addressing many of the misaligned private market incentives.
A decentralised approach, allowing venture capital to reach into every segment of the economy.
A natively evergreen structure that is less negatively exposed to market cycles and platform shifts.
A competitive industry with vastly superior returns, where managerial skill earns allocation.
The Role of the DAO
A treasury DAO, in this context, is a pool of LP capital, such as endowments, pension funds, sovereign wealth, fund of funds, or high-net-worth individuals. An LP may choose to manage their own DAO, or join an existing DAO.
Indeed, DAOs are fluid organisations that can merge or split as required. For example, a collective of high-net-worth individuals may form a temporary DAO around a particular opportunity. If a member leaves the DAO, or the DAO is dissolved, the division of outstanding investment economics is handled by the existing smart contracts.
Larger DAOs benefit from access to strategies with more demanding allocations, and the ability to balance the pool of capital across a more diversified set of asset classes. A smaller DAO, on the other hand, may set a much higher hurdle for GP performance but offer above-market compensation contracts.
The DAO automates all financial operations (treasury management, fund transfers, fee payments, report generation, and distributions) through smart contracts.
The Role of Venture Capital
As a result of the market compression, venture capital is now primarily focused on origination. Successful VCs recognise opportunities before they generate enough data to be legible to algorithmic capital. They explore qualitative signals, human psychology and future scenarios in a way that a machine still cannot.
Access to the DAOs is as simple as submitting a ledger of private market transactions. If the ledger demonstrates a good risk-adjusted return in a particular strategy they may be awarded an allocation contract and the associated fee and carry contracts.
Each DAO federates a broad base of independent VCs or small partnerships, effectively solving the top-of-funnel for investment opportunities and fundraising friction for founders, as in every industry, market or region there is likely to be someone on the lookout for opportunities.
Indeed, if their performance is sufficient, it does not matter where a GP lives, works, or went to school. They can participate in the DAO full-time, or part-time. For example:
In some cases, specialists in fields like biotech or defense can supplement their income with a modest fee stream by surfacing the occasional interesting company.
Elsewhere, a successful angel investor might convert their track record into a large enough allocation to make investing a full-time career, without jumping through any hoops.
Further downstream, specialist VCs (with deep industry, CFO or internationalisation experience) are still able to find alpha within the later-stage opportunities, shaping successful exits. The highly-automated nature of investment (with investments often made directly by the DAO) at these stages allows them to manage a large book, and focus on signals of overlooked value to pre-empt funding rounds(which, in-turn, the AI learns from).
As each GP’s track record improves, they’re able to compete for incrementally larger allocations at more prestigious DAOs that offer more favourable compensation terms.
Track record is understood through a blend of efficiency (realised IRR), risk (Sharpe ratio) and persistence. This allows a DAO to recognise potential in even relatively amateur investors, as well as downgrading or ejecting underperforming investors.
Emerging Performance
Structural secondaries are core to this model of venture capital, enabled by reduced information friction. The question of how long a startup chooses to remain private is redundant in a market with regular release-valves for liquidity.
This reality aligns with LPs, who want to see faster cash returns. Similarly, VCs that can stay above benchmarks (typically 12-15%, realised IRR) are able to supplement their fee income with a regular drip-feed of carry from liquidity events.
This generally means exiting a significant portion of each position in year 2-4. For example, if a GP sells half of their stake in a company in year 3, at a 3x valuation increase, that’s already a 14.5% realised IRR.
Shortening the liquidity horizon to ~3 years from ~12 years makes understanding GP performance more practical, particularly with an evergreen fund strategy. It also shapes the incentives of downstream investors who are more likely to scrutinise fast-growing investment opportunities for the sustainability of that growth.
Radical Transparency
With all transactions signed with their on-chain identify, each investor (angel or GP) holds immutable and portable deal attribution which may be shared and compared. Thus, performance-based competition is real and important.
“Top VC” lists are based on clear methodology and hard data, and each publisher competes to provide the gold standard of measuring performance across the metrics mentioned above.
VCs that opt-in to sharing their ledger can use their ranking as a public recognition of their ability, feeding into other opportunities outside of access to investable capital.
Venture Firms
While there is no strictly necessary role for venture firms in a world where smart contracts handle a lot of the central functions such as financial operations, compliance and reporting, VCs may still choose to assemble where “the whole is greater than the sum of the part(ner)s”. Most of the time, this manifests as a brand-building exercise to develop inbound interest or a goal of providing more stable results with the aggregate firm performance.
In these cases, informal partnerships may still manage attribution on an individual partner basis, or more formal partnerships may attribute to the firm, with an individual partner as the secondary signature. This way, the firms themselves may compete for ranking (and potentially provide more stable returns) without eliminating the portability and accountability of a partner’s attribution.
Conclusion
In this reimagined model, venture capital works because the structure is built around the desired outcome: managerial skill is focused where it makes the most difference, performance is rewarded with capital, transparency breeds healthy competition, and the broader distribution is able to surface more opportunities and potential outliers.
This represents a new social contract for funding innovation, expanding who gets to invest, who gets funded, and where new category leaders may be found.
